Leave to Appeal Denied, Where Trial Judge Refused Costs to Successful Defendant

In a somewhat surprising decision, the Divisional Court has denied leave to appeal a trial judge’s refusal to award costs to a successful defendant in a personal injury action.

Dinham v. Brejkaln arose out of a motor vehicle accident. The defendant was found liable for the accident itself and the jury awarded damages of $3,000. But after the jury rendered its decision, the defendant brought a threshold motion, which succeeded. In other words, the trial judge found that the plaintiff had not proved “a permanent impairment of an important physical function as a result of the accident and furthermore that the plaintiff had not proven that his headaches were actually caused by the accident. As a result of these conclusions, the plaintiff was not entitled to any recovery.”

The trial judge also noted that the statutory deductible of $15,000 would have wiped out the $3,000 award of damages.

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C.A. Says Purchaser of House Bound to Complete Deal

contract.jpg  Today, the Court of Appeal released a short ruling in a case involving a disputed real estate transaction. Its reasons are of interest to practitioners in contract law generally, since they show a marked reluctance to allow a party to get out of a written contract without good reason.

Ball v. Hardy was an appeal from a decision of Justice Albert Roy. It arose out of a real estate transaction, in which, after a couple of days of negotiation,  the parties had prepared and executed a handwritten agreement of purchase and sale. Neither had consulted a lawyer, but they had agreed to do so the next day, in order to proceed with the transaction. The purchaser paid a deposit to the vendor.

However, the next day, the purchaser said that she wanted more time to think about the deal. Ultimately, she refused to close the transaction and the vendors sued for specific performance.

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Insurer’s Failure to Observe SABS Timeline Doesn’t Disentitle It to CAT DAC Assessment

Despite the mandatory language of the SABS time requirements (the insurer “shall”…), a Superior Court judge has held that an insurer’s failure to comply with those requirements in setting up a CAT DAC assessment does not mean that it loses its right to require that the assessment be done.

In Gray v. Pilot Insurance, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident. She applied for and received statutory accident benefits from her insurer, Pilot Insurance. A neurological assessment indicated that she was catastrophically impaired. Pilot advised the plaintiff that it would require her to undergo an assessment at a Designated Assessment Centre to determine whether she was “catastrophically impaired” under the provisions of the Insurance Act.

Through inadvertence, Pilot failed to respond to the plaintiff’s “application for determination of catastrophic impairment” within the 30-day period mandated by the SABS. Upon discovering its error, Pilot agreed to continue the plaintiff’s benefits, on a without prejudice basis, while the “CAT DAC” assessment was held. However, the plaintiff refused to undergo the assessment, taking the position that Pilot’s failure to comply with the SABS timelines relieved her of any oblgiation to undergo the assessment.

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Surveillance Ruled Inadmissible

camera.jpg   Lis v. Lombard Insurance illustrates a common difficulty with surveillance videotape. Under Rule 30.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a “document” (which would include a videotape) on which privilege has been claimed, cannot be used at trial without leave of the trial judge unless the privilege is waived at least 90 days before the commencement of trial. The sole exception is if the “document” is used to impeach the credibility of a witness.

So, defence counsel armed with surveillance has two options. If privilege is waived on the tape and accompanying reports more than 90 days before trial, the surveillance can be used as substantive evidence, to show the plaintiff’s physical capability, daily activities, etc. (assuming that these are relevant issues). However, the defendant loses any element of surprise because the plaintiff will have seen the videotape prior to testifying at trial.

If the plaintiff has been examined for discovery and has been committed unambiguously to statements from which it would be difficult to resile at trial, the loss of the “ambush” factor might not be too important. The point is that once the privilege has been waived, defence counsel is no longer limited to using the surveillance for impeachment only.

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Insurer’s Denial of Claim that Ultimately Succeeds Not Bad Faith: S.C.C.

In a decision that will be of great interest to insurers, the Supreme Court of Canada today struck down a $100,000 award of punitive damages that had been made against a disability insurer. In Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance, the plaintiff had long term disability insurance under a group policy with Sun Life. She was diagnosed with fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome. Sun Life paid benefits for several years but in 1997, terminated them. In doing so, it relied on video surveillance of the plaintiff which, it felt, was not consistent with an inability to do any work. There was evidently a significant body of medical evidence though, that indicated that the plaintiff was, in fact, unable to work.

The insured sued Sun Life and one week before the trial was to commence, the insurer offered to reinstate her benefits and to pay all arrears, with interest. The trial proceeded on the issue of damages.

At trial in the British Columbia Supreme Court, the plaintiff received an award of $20,000 but her claim for punitive damages was dismissed. On appeal to the B.C. Court of Appeal, the mental distress award was upheld. The Court of Appeal also added damages of $100,000 in punitive damages, finding that the insurer had acted in bad faith.

Sun Life appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In a unanimous decision, released earlier today, the Court upheld the $20,000 award for mental distress but set aside the punitive damages award.

The Court provided a helpful discussion of the circumstances in which damages for mental distress will be awarded in breach of contract cases (where courts have traditionally been reluctant to make such awards). After reviewing the jurisprudence, the Supreme Court concluded that the availability of damages for mental distress, like other contractual damages, will ultimately be determined by the expectations of the parties at the time of making the contract: “The court should ask “what did the contract promise?” and provide compensation for those promises.  The aim of compensatory damages is to restore the wronged party to the position he or she would have been in had the contract not been broken.”

Ordinary commercial contracts, the Court said, will usually not attract damages for mental distress. This is because any mental suffering is usually minimal and is not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract.

But the Court went on to say that damages for mental distress are more likely to be recoverable in the case of certain types of contracts (referred to in the decision as “peace of mind” contracts):

The matter is otherwise, however, when the parties enter into a contract, an object of which is to secure a particular psychological benefit. In such a case, damages arising from such mental distress should in principle be recoverable where they are established on the evidence and shown to have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. The basic principles of contract damages do not cease to operate merely because what is promised is an intangible, like mental security.

Sun Life’s disability insurance policy was a “peace of mind” contract, the Court felt, and the trial judge did not err in awarding damages of $20,000 under this head.

Of equal or greater importance to insurers was the finding by the Court,  that mere denial of a claim by an insurer is not bad faith. Thus, denial, without more, does not give rise to an entitlement to punitive damages, even where the insured’s claim ultimately succeeds.

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Costs Premium of $350,000 Awarded in Sandhu

  keenspot-premium-logo.gif  The case of Sandhu v. Wellington Place Apartments has produced another significant ruling. Readers will recall that Sandhu is the recent personal injury action in which damages of over $12 million were awarded.

Today’s decision by Madam Justice Carolyn Horkins dealt with the issue of costs premiums. The plaintiffs and defendants had agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis to the date of an offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter. These costs were over $1 million by the time this motion was argued. It dealt with whether counsel for the plaintiffs was entitled, in addition, to a costs premium of $1 million.

The decision is valuable because Justice Horkins reviewed the caselaw and undertook a conceptual analysis of the subject. This is something that is badly needed; premium awards to date have been all over the map. (The Supreme Court of Canada is going to look at the issue in Ritchie v. Walker, now making its way to a hearing date in that court.)

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Divisional Court Sets Out Defence Requirements to Establish Mitigation

In Branco v. Ephstein, a motor vehicle case, the Divisional Court has ordered a new trial, on the ground that the trial judge did not adequately explain to the jury the onus that arises where a defence of mitigation is raised.

The jury had made an award of $750.00 after an eight-day trial. The Divisional Court said that “[t]he learned trial judge in his charge failed to confirm that although the plaintiff has a duty to mitigate, the defendant bore the onus of proof that the plaintiff failed to take adequate steps by way of mitigation in accordance with the principles enunciated in the case law. The omission in essence shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff to prove that she took adequate steps to mitigate.”

After reviewing the law, the Divisional Court (Justices Gravely, Wilson and Swinton) said there are three things that the defence must establish in order to rely upon the principle of mitigation:

(1)   the steps which the plaintiff might have pursued to avert loss;

(2)   the reasonableness of pursuing those steps; and

(3)   the extent to which loss would thereby have been averted (in effect, the amount by which the damages should be reduced).

The defence, the court said, “must bring forward reasoned, factually based evidence to illustrate that the plaintiff failed to mitigate, addressing the elements in this three-part test”.

This decision makes it clear that a defendant cannot just talk about mitigation, but must lead evidence to prove the failure to mitigate.

The court attached, as an appendix to the decision, a model jury charge that properly explains the principle of mitigation. It is a precedent from British Columbia.

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City Not Liable for Slip and Fall Where Snow Removal Efforts Were “Reasonable”

ice_storm.jpg  The decision of Madam Justice Wailan Low in Ondrade v. Toronto (City) provides a useful review of the law relating to the liability of municipal corporations for “slip and fall” accidents that take place during severe winter weather.

The plaintiff had slipped and broken his wrist during a storm that struck Toronto on February 22 and 23, 2003. As described by Her Honour, “[o]ver the course of less than 48 hours, the City experienced snow, ice pellets, rain and freezing rain. Weather statistics kept for Toronto Pearson and Toronto Islands indicate that the temperature fluctuated from 2.4 degrees Celsius to minus 9.3 degrees Celsius. There was blowing and drifting snow. There was a total of 28 cm of precipitation, with 25.2 cm on the 22nd and 2.8 cm on the 23rd.”

Under s. 44(1) of the Municipal Act, the City had an obligation to keep the highway “in a state of repair that is reasonable in the circumstances”.

Section 44(3)(b) of the Act provides a defence to a municipality if it took reasonable steps to prevent the default from arising.

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Summary Judgment Granted on Basis of Conflicting Opinions on Quebec Law

Usually, the law of a “foreign” jurisdiction (which, in this context, includes that of the other Canadian provinces) has to be proved at an Ontario trial through expert testimony. If the foreign law is not proved, the general rule is that the Ontario court will assume that that law is the same as its own.

In Turek v. Kaycan and Marcotte though, Mr. Justice Donald Ferguson short-circuited this process by granting summary judgment without hearing any oral testimony from experts. Instead, he considered two conflicting opinion letters from Quebec lawyers. He resolved the conflict by accepting one opinion over the other. What was even more adventurous was his finding, that he was entitled to consider directly the caselaw and statutes of the “foreign” jurisdiction (in this case, Quebec).

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Global Offer to Severally Liable Defendants Doesn’t Qualify Under Rule 49

The decision of Justice Nancy Spies in Tuffhide Products v. Rhino Systems of Canada Inc. is a cautionary tale on the subject of offers to settle in multi-defendant cases.

The plaintiffs had sued two defendants. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs had offered to settle for $150,000 plus interest and partial indemnity costs. At trial, the plaintiffs were awarded damages of $187,664, plus interest. They sought substantial indemnity costs from the date of the offer, arguing that the judgment had been more favourable than their offer. They relied on Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, Justice Spies rejected this argument and limited the costs to a partial indemnity basis. Her reason for doing so was that the claims against the two defendants were quite independent of each other. The offer could not be accepted by either defendant without paying the entire amount:

The claims asserted by the plaintiffs against the two defendants were two separate, independent and distinct causes of action. It was never suggested that there should be joint liability on the claims and so because the offer was for a global amount it was not possible for either defendant to settle the claim asserted against that defendant by paying a particular amount. In this regard I adopt the reasons of Polowin J. in Sommerard. Accordingly, I find that the plaintiffs’ Offer to Settle was not a valid Rule 49 offer and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any of their costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Because of the discrete nature of the claims, Justice Spies concluded that she was required to assess separately the partial indemnity costs payable by each defendant. In the result, one defendant had to pay only $14,421.12, while the other was ordered to pay $69,965.62.

This case underlines the importance of analyzing the theoretical basis of an action (or defence) before making an offer to settle.

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